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In his work Ideas for a Philosophy of Human History (1784-1791), the preacher and 
philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder deals critically with the philosophy of Enlightenment, 
in which he sees the seed of a racial and cultural classification that considers peoples 
outside Europe as inferior. This centrally included Africa and its inhabitants as 
represented by German philosophers. Such a way of imagining Africa, widely shared 
amongst thinkers of the Enlightenment, echoes still today in various representations in 
the Western media, and could even serve as an explanation of the current migration 
drama in the Mediterranean. Herder, who was well informed of these representations in 
his own day, attempted, in Ideas, to deconstruct the then prevalent image of Africa and 
its peoples, and thereby entered into an intellectual dispute with his philosophical 
contemporaries, whose position was to reaffirm the supremacy of European culture and 
soe justify slavery and colonialism. This paper first focuses on Herder’s context, then 
explains his positions and his work, and shows how his attempt ended in a de-
construction of  the “Africa” of the Enlightenment. 
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Introduction  
Johann Gottfried Herder, the preacher and philosopher, born on August 25th, 1744 in 
Mohrungen, is considered all over the world to be one of the most important, but also one 
of the most controversial philosophers of his time. The reason is that he 
uncompromisingly criticized many of his contemporaries’ views. He summarized his 
counter-Enlightenment positions in a historically oriented teaching whose influence 
touched, for example, the French Enlighteners and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.1 




 Herder’s questioning attitude announced itself already in individual writings, such 
as the treatise from 1774, Also a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity, 
which he characterized as a “contribution to contributions” in the preamble of his newly 
published work, Ideas for a Philosophy of Human History (1784-1791).2  This latter 
publication contains many of the author’s positions on religion, nature- and climate-theory, 
and language, but especially on history and anthropology, the positions that made him 
into the leading cultural theoretician of his time. In opposition to the stance of his 
contemporary, Immanuel Kant, who sees different races amongst the peoples, or Hegel, 
who disparaged Africa as the place of darkness—to which I will return below—Herder 
takes a different path.3  
We want to concern ourselves in what follows specifically with the section on the 
“Organization of the African peoples,” insofar as, when one views it against the backdrop 
of images of Africa that were debated in the press, one sees that Herder proposes here 
a different Africa, quite distinct from the “Africa” of his day.4 The work gives expression to 
Herder’s views that not only place in question Eurocentric self-evidences of the 
Enlightenment, but are even directed in many instances against European historiography 
and ethnography [Völkerkunde]. In expressing such views, Herder places Africa in a 
positive light, similar to positive travel writing of the day, and takes, in connection with this 
positive view of Africa, culturally relativistic positions that were daring for his time. The 
de-centering of Europe appears to him as necessary, in order to initiate an era of new 
studies in cultural anthropology. Accordingly, this work is conceived as a new philosophy, 
which of course then attracted massive critique, since, at this time, Herder’s predecessors 
and teachers propagated a different image of Africa. Above all Immanuel Kant, the 
philosopher and key figure of the Enlightenment, wrote a review of Herder’s philosophy 
of history, in which he criticized Herder strongly:  
Daher möchte wohl, was ihm Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit 
heißt, etwas ganz anderes sein, als was man gewöhnlich unter diesem 
Namen versteht: nicht etwa eine logische Pünktlichkeit in Bestimmung der 
Begriffe, oder sorgfältige Unterscheidung und Bewährung der Grundsätze, 
sondern ein sich nicht lange verweilender, viel umfassender Blick, eine in 
Auffindung von Analogien fertige Sagazität, im Gebrauche derselben aber 




kühne Einbildungskraft, verbunden mit der Geschicklichkeit, für seinen 
immer in dunkeler Ferne gehaltenen Gegenstand durch Gefühle und 
Empfindungen einzunehmen, die, als Wirkungen von einem großen 
Gehalte der Gedanken, oder als vielbedeutende Winke mehr von sich 
vermuten lassen, als kalte Beurteilung wohl gerade zu in denselben 
antreffen würde. 
 
Hence what philosophy of the history of humanity means to him may very 
well be something quite different from what is normally understood under 
that name. His is not a logical precision in the definition of concepts or 
careful adherence to principles, but rather a fleeting, sweeping view, an 
adroitness in unearthing analogies in the wielding of which he shows a bold 
imagination. This is combined with cleverness in soliciting sympathy for his 
subject—kept in increasingly hazy remoteness—by means of sentiment 
and sensation. Further suspicion is stimulated as to whether these emotions 
are effects of a prodigious system of thought or only equivocal hints which 
cool, critical examination would uncover in them. 5 
 
The goal of the present essay is to place Herder’s image of Africa under a magnifying 
glass, as he develops it in “Organization of the African Peoples,” and to discuss the 
author’s culturally relativist positions. To achieve this, I will first retrace the image of Africa 
in the Enlightenment, then analyze the Ideas, and finally discuss the author’s de-
constructive anthropological positions.   
 
Africa in Herder’s Day 
In Herder’s times, “Africa” is a construct that is represented negatively in the total 
European consciousness, and especially in thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. 
Hegel.6 Precisely during the Enlightenment, the opinion was widely embraced that one 
had to civilize other peoples by bringing them the values of rationality, or reason, for only 
in this way could human beings and societies make progress. In accordance with such 
views, it was decided in Göttingen that other peoples and their customs should be studied 




in a new discipline. This only became a solidly established discipline in the second half of 
the 19th century, dividing itself off from history and geography, with which it had hitherto 
always been bound up.7 Within this Enlightenment program, the development of humanity 
can be reached only through the force of reason. Reason is thus supposed to be 
privileged here over and against superstition and other irrational behavior.  
A logical corollary of this rationalist conception of history as the inexorable 
progression of humankind to a cosmopolitan condition of rational 
perfectibility was the tendency of Enlightenment philosophers to demean or 
deride those cultures, past and present, which lacked consciousness of the 
principles of enlightened reason. Such cultures tended to be seen as lesser 
stages in the development towards this enlightened perfect end. Hence, in 
the view of Condorcet, it was the good fortune of the barbarous, 
unenlightened cultures of his day that they could acquire these rational 
principles of Enlightenment directly from the enlightened culture of 
European society.8 
 
From this passage it emerges that here it is especially the extra-European cultures that 
were being considered irrational. In this respect, within the European cultural space two 
mutually opposed positions collided. One of these represented the opinion that there are 
backward peoples who should be cultivated by means of Enlightenment thought, and the 
other spoke up on behalf of the recognition of the simple life of the natural peoples 
[Naturvölker].9  Especially in many French philosophers one could find the latter view 
early on. Already in the 16th century, Montaigne propagates the myth of the “noble 
savage.” He presented the following thesis in a famous essay, in order to go beyond the 
negative image of extra-European cultures:  
Or je trouve, pour revenir à mon propos, qu’il n’y a rien de barbare et de 
sauvage en cette nation, à ce qu’on m’en a rapporté ; sinon que chacun 
appelle barbarie ce qui n’est pas de son usage ; comme de vrai, il semble 
que nous n’avons d’autre mire de la vérité et de la raison que l’exemple et 
l’idée des opinions et usances du pays où nous sommes. Là est toujours la 
parfaite religion, la parfaite police, parfait et accompli usage de toutes 




choses. Ils sont sauvages, de même que nous appelons sauvages les fruits 
que nature, de soi et de son progrès ordinaire, a produits : là où, à la vérité, 
ce sont ceux que nous avons altérés par notre artifice, et détournés de 
l’ordre commun, que nous devrions appeler plutôt sauvages. En ceux-là 
sont vives et vigoureuses les vraies et plus utiles et naturelles vertus et 
propriétés, lesquelles nous avons abâtardies en ceux-cy, et les avons 
seulement accommodées au plaisir de notre goût corrompu. Et si pourtant, 
la saveur même et délicatesse se trouve à notre goût excellente, à l’envi 
des nôtres, en divers fruits de ces contrées-là sans culture. Ce n’est pas 
raison que l’art gagne le point d’honneur de sur notre grande et puissante 
mère Nature. Nous avons tant rechargé la beauté et la richesse de ses 
ouvrages par nos inventions, que nous l’avons tout étouffée. Si est-ce que 
partout où sa pureté reluit, elle fait merveilleuse honte à nos vaines et 
frivoles entreprises.  
 
Now, to return to my subject, I think there is nothing barbarous and savage 
in that nation, from what I have been told, except that each man calls 
barbarism whatever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have no 
other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions 
and customs of the country we live in. There is always the perfect religion, 
the perfect government, the perfect and accomplished manners in all things. 
Those people are wild, just as we call wild the fruits that Nature has 
produced by herself and in her normal course; whereas really it is those that 
we have changed artificially and led astray from the common order, that we 
should rather call wild. The former retain alive and vigorous their genuine, 
their most useful and natural, virtues and properties, which we have 
debased in the latter in adapting them to gratify our corrupted taste. And yet 
for all that, the savor and delicacy of some uncultivated fruits of those 
countries is quite as excellent, even to our taste, as that of our own. It is not 
reasonable that art should win the place of honor over our great and 
powerful mother Nature. We have so overloaded the beauty and richness 




of her works by our inventions that we have quite smothered her. Yet 
wherever her purity shines forth, she wonderfully puts to shame our vain 
and frivolous attempts.10 
 
This myth of the noble savage spread throughout Europe up into the 19th century with 
such thinkers as Bougainville in France11, and reached into Germany with scholars such 
as Wieland, but with different emphases.12 These regions outside of Europe were 
upgraded or downgraded not just in purely cultural terms, but also in terms of various 
shades of skin-coloring, which made the question of skin-color into an important criterion 
for differentiating between various peoples and various cultures. Some of the educated 
men of the Enlightenment, according to Hund, defended the point of view that one should 
go beyond skin-color to the bone-structure, in order to gain incontrovertible proofs of the 
differences between the peoples. Above all, the anatomist, Samuel Thomas von 
Sömmering defended this position, which he summarized in an essay.13  However, this 
association between skin-color and culture (or civilization) developed in phases, 
according to Hund.  
Die erste Phase ist gekennzeichnet durch eine mit dem Erfolg des 
europäischen Kolonialismus und der Entfaltung der transatlantischen 
Sklaverei einhergehende Verschiebung der Wahrnehmung. Sie machte aus 
den überkommenen Gegensätzen von Zivilisierten und Barbaren sowie 
Gläubigen und Heiden die Dichotomie von Weißen und Schwarzen. Die 
zweite Phase wird von der Entwicklung und Durchsetzung des an der 
Rassenkategorie orientierten Farbrassismus bestimmt. Dieser Prozeß 
wurde wesentlich von den Wissenschaften der Aufklärung betrieben und 
mündete in ein Konzept, das die Indikatoren für die weiße Norm unter die 
Haut verlegte. Die dritte Phase ist durch die soziale Verallgemeinerung und 
kulturelle Codierung des Weißseins geprägt. Es wurde auch den unteren 
Klassen zugesprochen, die häufig bereit waren, es nach außen wie innen 
zu verteidigen. Und es wurde zu einem Wertesystem verarbeitet, das selbst 
die Diskreditierung des Rassenbegriffs überdauerte.  
 




The first phase is characterized by a displacement of perception that goes 
hand in hand with the success of European colonialism and the unfolding 
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.  It constructed the dichotomy of white and 
black on the basis of the received oppositions between civilized and 
barbaric, as between believers and heathens. The second phase is 
determined by the development and realization of the color-racism that was 
oriented in terms of the race-category. This process was advanced 
essentially by the sciences of the Enlightenment, and issued in the concept 
that placed the indicators for the white norm beneath the skin.  The third 
phase is marked by the social generalization and cultural encoding of being-
white. It was also passed on to the lower classes, who were often ready to 
defend it against the outside and against the inside. And it was developed 
into a value-system that persisted even beyond the discrediting of the race-
concept.14    
 
Africa precisely belonged to the regions of the world in which the Enlighteners saw neither 
civilization nor culture.  Even before this, it counted as a dark and backward continent. 
During the Enlightenment, however, nothing in this image was changed, for in Immanuel 
Kant it receives further confirmation. This strengthens our sense of the degree of racism 
at this time, against which in various writings Herder will later rebel. The connection Kant 
establishes between parts of the world and national characteristics, where perfection is 
reserved for the peoples of Europe--that is, the whites--is not only questionable, but 
serves a particular purpose. It enables him to classify the people in accordance with parts 
of the globe, in order to close, concerning Africa, with the infamous sentence:  “the 
negroes of Africa have, of their very nature, no feelings that go beyond the ridiculous.”15 
 
II. ”Ideas” for a New Philosophy 
In his many publications, Herder positions himself amongst the philosophers at the end 
of the Enlightenment as a controversial personality by either categorically controverting 
or at least raising critical questions about all hitherto established self-evidences. His 
critique of the Enlightenment included many of the works of French and German 




Enlighteners, with whose works he had become familiar already as a young man. 
Herder’s settlement of his accounts with this period can be traced in many writings. He 
does not just contest the views of his predecessors and contemporaries concerning the 
goal of philosophy; rather, according to Herder, all of historiography and the philosophy 
of language needs to be reconceptualized.  Indeed, the philosophy of language is a 
crucial aspect of his critique of the ubiquity of autonomous reason in the discourse of the 
Enlighteners:  
Auch wenn Herder nicht alle Teile seines Werkes sprachphilosophisch 
begründet, so lassen sich doch alle im Medium der Sprachreflexion 
thematisieren. Allerdings meint Sprache hier nicht nur die Lautsprache, 
sondern ebenso die Sprache der Empfindung oder allgemeiner auch solche 
Symbolische Formen, die weniger systematisch geordnet sind als die 
verbale Sprache. Im Medium der Sprachphilosophie auslegbar sind 
deswegen alle Dimensionen, an die Herder Vernunft rückbinden will: die 
ganze historisch-kulturelle Welt. 
 
Even if Herder did not ground all parts of his work in a philosophy of 
language, nonetheless all of them can be thematized in the medium of 
linguistic reflections. However, language means here not just the spoken 
language, but also the language of feeling or even more generally such 
symbolic forms as are less systematically ordered than verbal language. All 
of the dimensions to which Herder wishes to link reason—i.e. all the 
dimensions of the historical-cultural world—are interpretable in the medium 
of the philosophy of language.16 
 
The attitude of the representatives of autonomous reason toward foreign peoples in Asia, 
North America, and above all Africa supported the oppression and exploitation that was 
then being perpetrated upon the land and people of parts of the world outside of Europe. 
Various scholars show how this classification of peoples and cultures on the basis of the 
Eurocentric categorization of people according to colors and races, which was supported 
by the idea of Enlightenment, propagates its effects up to our own times. Being white, as 




an encoded belonging to a higher culture and civilization, has its origin especially in the 
period of the Enlightenment, which attempted to ground this notion in a scientific manner. 
This normative interpretation pursued various goals and served as an instrument of 
oppression, but also as a means of classification of human beings:  
 
Die durch die Erzeugung weißer Normativität bewirkte rassische 
Entfremdung wäre als sozialökonomisches Unterdrückungsverhältnis oder 
ideologischer Verblendungs-zusammenhang nur unzureichend 
beschrieben. Der durch sie erzeugte, Rassenmakel war von Anfang an 
nicht allein Zeichen für angebliche kulturelle Zurückgebliebenheit, sondern 
diente einer körperlichen Stigmatisierung, die tendenziell die 
Menschlichkeit derer in Frage stellte, die mit ihm behaftet wurden. 
 
The racist alienation that was effected by the production of white normativity 
could be only insufficiently described as a socio-economic relation of 
exploitation or an ideological form of obscurantism. The racial failing it 
produces was from the very beginning not only a sign of ostensible cultural 
backwardness, but subserved rather the purposes of a bodily stigmatization 
that tendentially placed in question the humanity of those who were marked 
by it.17 
 
In his philosophical reflexions, Herder rebelled against precisely this norm, which had 
already established itself during the Enlightenment.18 He divides his book in different 
parts, each of which critically responds to the Enlightenment. Herder’s programmatic text 
orients itself around the thoroughgoing deconstruction of the ideas of his predecessors, 
in part also his teachers, including Immanuel Kant and J.G. Hamann.  He established 
himself in various treatises and writings as an opponent of Kant, whose views he placed 
in question in numerous contributions.  As an example of these we can mention his 
critique of transcendental philosophy, which he saw as a pure utopia, especially since it 
wanted to free itself as autonomous reason from elements such as language, experience, 
and history.19 The composition of the Ideas stretched over several years, more precisely 




from 1784 to 1791, and the book was published in the Johann Friedrich Hartknoch Verlag. 
The publication, divided into four parts, treated various themes that Herder considered to 
be fundamental for the new philosophy of his time. Aside from the critiques of the ubiquity 
of reason, the Ideas begin with the planet on which the entire human race lives, planet 
earth, which Herder sees as a star amongst other stars. In connection with these 
reflections on the earth, Herder treated the theme of nature, specifically so as to reject 
the Enlightenment model, namely the materialist-mechanistic view of nature.20  
This monumental fragment treated also language-philosophical themes that put 
reason in touch with language. In this sense, it became a new philosophy, which placed 
history, language, and earth under a microscope, and revised previous 
conceptualizations. Precisely concerning the theme of history Herder took new paths, 
which led to a new anthropology. In this sense he responded to the understanding of 
culture that was current during the Enlightenment, which denied to other peoples both 
culture and reason. This response, insofar as it concerns Africa, can be found in a chapter 
in the second Part of the Ideas. It is rightly considered to be a rejection of his 
predecessors’ traditional conceptions concerning foreign peoples and cultures. I would 
like now to discuss more closely the push-back against general prejudices with regard to 
Africa that is contained in this substantial work.  
 
III.  The De-struction of “Africa” 
Herder’s image of Africa, as I said above, can be found in the second part of the Ideas 
and contains the thinker’s various de-constructive positions with respect to then current 
view of Africa and its inhabitants. Like the other chapters in the same Part, this chapter is 
supposed to deconstruct--in Derrida’s sense21--or, better—with reference to 
Heidegger22—destroy all of the opinions that had been considered valid during the 
Enlightenment and before. If one regards Herder’s image of Africa in the Ideas from this 
point of view, one can say that Herder irrevocably refused the entire image of Africa of 
his time. Herder begins his deconstruction of the racism of his period as follows:  
Billig müssen wir, wenn wir zum Lande der Schwarzen übergehn, unsre 
stolzen Vorurteile verleugnen und die Organisation ihres Erdstrichs so 
unparteiisch betrachten, als ob sie die einzige in der Welt wäre. Mit eben 




dem Recht, mit dem wir den Neger für einen verfluchten Sohn Chams und 
für ein Ebenbild des Unholds halten, kann er seine grausame Räuber für 
Albinos und weiße Satane erklären, die nur aus Schwachheit der Natur so 
entartet sind, wie, dem Nordpol nahe, mehrere Tiere in Weiß ausarten. 
 
It is only fair, when we proceed to the country of the blacks, that we lay 
aside our proud prejudices and consider the nature of this region with as 
much impartiality as if there were no other in the world. The Negro, whom 
we consider a cursed son of Ham and the image of the fiend, has equal 
right to call his cruel despoilers albinos and white satans who so 
degenerated only because of a flaw of nature, just as several animal 
species living near the North Pole degenerated into whiteness.23 
 
What Herder is alluding to in this passage is the color-racism demonstrably present in his 
day amongst many Enlighteners, above all in Kant and Sömmering, who insofar as they 
dealt with peoples beyond the limits of Europe set up color as a criterion for distinguishing 
one race from another.24 It is relevant to remark that Herder polemically turned the tables, 
and applied this same color-racism to the Europeans, introducing the same arguments 
against them as they used against the extra-European peoples. Thus, he put into the 
mouth of the Black person, who was so generally disrespected, exactly the right 
arguments, supported by the notion that the sun had soaked him most strongly with its 
color. Thus, he became the original human being [Urmensch]. His richness, i.e. gold, was 
also a sign of pride, and his strong nature (tall trees, powerful animals) was an object of 
immeasurable magnitude. In this way, Herder destroyed the arguments of his 
predecessors, by simply turning them around and counseling people to be modest in their 
encounters with Africa.  
 Herder’s second point of intervention was relativistic, for he now posed the 
questions, which were important to him, concerning the causes of the different skin-
shadings of the various peoples.  
Die schwarze Farbe der Neger ist nicht wunderbarer in ihrer Art als die 
weiße, braune, gelbe, rötliche andrer Nationen. Weder das Blut noch das 




Gehirn noch der Same der Neger ist schwarz, sondern das Netz unter der 
Oberhaut, das wir alle haben und das auch bei uns, wenigstens an einigen 
Teilen und unter manchen Umständen, mehr oder minder gefärbt ist. 
Camper hat dies erwiesen, und nach ihm haben wir alle die Anlage, Neger 
zu werden. Selbst bei den kalten Samojeden ist der Streif um die Brüste der 
Weiber bemerkt worden; der Keim der Negerschwärze konnte in ihrem 
Klima bloß nicht weiter entwickelt werden. 
 
The black color of the negroes is no more to be wondered at than the white, 
brown, yellow, or reddish colors of other nations. Neither the blood nor the 
brain nor the semen of the Negroes is black, but the reticular membrane 
beneath the cuticle, which is also in us, at least in some parts and under 
certain circumstances, more or less colored. Camper has demonstrated 
this, and according to him we all have the potential of becoming Negroes. 
Even in the cold of the Samoyed country, the ring around the nipples of the 
female breast has been noted; the germ of Negro blackness could not be 
further developed in that climate.25 
 
Even more importantly, one can pose the question as to what causes the color difference 
on the African continent, and what consequences are to be drawn for the new philosophy 
he promoted. Herder summarized the answers to these questions in a theoretical essay 
on climate. In order to illustrated concretely his climate theory, he adduced parallels with 
Portuguese tribes that had lived in Africa for hundreds of years and who were similar to 
the Blacks in their coloring. Herder attributed this to the climate, for air and sun must have 
played, according to him, a large role in this. These produce effects in the behavior and 
nourishment of human beings in the places where they live, and in part also in these 
inhabitants’ cultures. Correspondingly, Herder held the opinion that in milder regions, 
where sea winds cool the heat, the skin becomes brown.26 His descriptions of peoples 
who live in Africa might well today evoke critical questions, for Herder divided Africa up 
into many parts, depending on whether one was in the North or beyond the Senegal River, 
where he supposed various physiognomies could be found. He thus remained a child of 




his age.  Above all insofar as, in the Ideas, he still describes cultures and human beings 
in terms of their external appearance, we can see that he remained caught up in the 
discursive matrix of his colleagues. The fact that Herder’s work retains traces of these 
traditional elements is indeed, no doubt, largely responsible for the negative reception of 
Herder outside Germany.27    
 It is above all in the realm of culture that Herder’s Ideas can be read as a counter-
Enlightenment program. Herder did not share the sense of a triumphant reason with the 
Enlightenment thinkers of his day. Above all, he placed in question their denial that there 
could be any knowledge outside the domain of reason. He thereby opened the way to a 
new anthropology which promises a number of different things. In this new anthropology 
the color-based racism was to be not merely relativized but deconstructed. Herder 
rejected every division of humanity into races. In the Ideas he proposed that for the 
grounding and existence of a race, difference in origin [Abstammung] would be the 
minimal necessary presupposition, which in this case is not given anywhere on earth. In 
addition, one would have to consider every region [Erdstrich] and every least shading of 
color-difference as constituting a race of its own, which was untenable. Building upon this 
idea, he saw neither four nor five races, but only one.28 Nor was this all. He called for 
caution in the description of other peoples. He was well aware, in this regard, of the 
limitation of his times:  
Aber wie arm sind wir überhaupt an geltenden Nachrichten aus diesem 
Strich der Erde! Kaum die Küsten des Landes kennen wir, und auch diese 
oft nicht weiter, als die europäischen Kanonen reichen. Das Innere von 
Afrika hat von neuern Europäern niemand durchreiset, wie es doch die 
arabischen Karawanen so oft tun; was wir von ihm wissen, sind Sagen aus 
dem Munde der Schwarzen oder ziemlich alte Nachrichten einiger 
glücklichen oder unglücklichen Abenteurer. - Zudem scheint auch bei den 
Nationen, die wir schon kennen könnten, das Auge der Europäer viel zu 
tyrannisch-sorglos zu sein, um bei schwarzen elenden Sklaven 
Unterschiede der Nationalbildung ausforschen zu wollen.  
 




But how deficient we are in authentic information about this region of the 
earth! We barely know the coastal areas of the country, and even these 
often no further than the reach of European cannon. No contemporary 
Europeans have traversed the interior of Africa, which is being done so 
frequently by Arab caravans; what we know of it is either from the tales of 
the blacks or from rather ancient reports by a few fortunate or unfortunate 
adventurers. Even the nations that, as things are, we might know, the eye 
of the European seems to behold with too tyrannical indifference to try to 




At once preacher and philosopher, Herder still counts today as one of the “four stars” of 
Weimar Classicism, alongside Goethe, Schiller, and Wieland. His critique of the 
Enlightenment and of the most important ideas of this time reveal him to be one of the 
most controversial thinkers of the Enlightenment period. Above all, the problematic 
between language and reason constituted one of the main points of contention of his 
philosophical positions.  
The manifold themes he discussed in a number of treatises appear in the eyes of 
his contemporaries, and still today, as somewhat scattered. His main work, Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Human History, is not a stringent and narrowly structured work, but rather 
a collection of different essays and fragments, on which he labored for four years.30 They 
are thus unsystematic reflections, which nonetheless pursue the goal of placing in 
question various views prevalent in Herder’s time. And the Herder-reception also takes 
note of it:  
Von den Schriften Herders liegt eine historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe 
immer noch nicht vor. Auch das gehört zu den Umständen einer 
Wirkungsgeschichte, in der Herder merkwürdig anonym geblieben ist: Sein 
Werk gilt als ungewöhnlich, zugleich wird es als unübersichtlich und als 
zusammenhangslos wahrgenommen. 
 




We still don’t have a complete historical-critical edition of Herder’s writings. 
That, too, belongs to the circumstances of a reception-history in which 
Herder has remained strangely anonymous: his work counts as unusual, 
but at the same time it is seen as incoherent and as not allowing of any 
overview.31 
 
In spite of these aspects, which give the impression that Herder is not particularly 
important for the period of the Enlightenment, his work has had a great influence on later 
generations of thinkers. To the anthropology of the later centuries, Herder made a great 
contribution through his organological conception of culture,32 and influenced thinkers 
such as Oswald Spengler,33 and later, Leo Frobenius.34 The latter became, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, of great importance  for the thinkers of negritude who were 
then studying in France, such as Senghor and Césaire, who promoted feeling as an 
important form of intelligence. The influence goes directly back to Herder, who contested 
during the Enlightenment the omnipotence of reason and its independence from 
language, history, and experience. Above all, his conception of cultures as singular 
individuals, whose legitimacy [Gültigkeit] resides solely within them, was for the thinkers 
of negritude a welcome argument. He announced: “For every human can and must think 
alone in his or her own language” and “every nation has the middle-point of its happiness 
within itself, as every cone has its geometric centroid!”35   
 With this sentence, Herder clearly refuses both the program of the Enlightenment 
and the program of colonialism, both of which want to force their values, their language, 
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